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CASES NOTED
social conditions, the judge reasons that the taxing aspects of the statute are
not separable from the regulatory police power aspects. Since the regulatory
requirements were deemed unconstitutional because they infringed upon the
state's police powers, the whole statute must be voided. The court admits
that federal courts generally do not inquire into the motives of Congress in
passing tax legislation. By differentiating between taxation and regulation
the court circumvents this rule.
It is interesting to note that the statute involved has been involved in
four district court decisions. Although the first two cases did not present
the same issue,6 one of them has already been affirmed by the Supreme
Court.7 The other two district court decisions,8 decided upon the very same
issue, have upheld the validity of the statute.
It is submitted that the Constantine case,9 which seemed to the judge in
the instant case to ". . . reveal the silver thread of truth. . ."0 and which
involved a similar tax statute, can be distinguished. That case involved a
tax on unlawful conduct of retail liquor businesses and in effect imposed a
federal penalty upon a state penalty. The statute in the instant case pur-
posely avoids this pitfall of draftsmanship by requiring the registration and
taxation of all persons engaged in wagering, regardless of legality tinder
state laws.
Viewed in the light of present social conditions and the past decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States,'' it seems almost certain that
the instant case will be reversed on appeal. Present Supreme Court deci-
sions strongly indicate the federal tax power is practically unlimited.
COURTS - CONSTRUCTIVE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
In contempt proceedings brought by the United States against re-
spondent, the district court found defendant guilty of criminal contempt
for disobeying and resisting an order of a federal court' which demanded
his surrender. Dedendant appealed, pleading that there was no order
actually issued at the time of the alleged contempt and that he had no
6. United States v. Forrester, 105 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ca. 1952) (safeguards against
self-incrimination not infringed upon); Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. 1951)
(action to restrain enforcement denied on ground that petitioner had unclean hands).
7. Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 939 (1952).
8. United States v. Smith, 106 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States v. Nadler,
105 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
9. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
10. 105 F. Supp. 322, 323 (1952).
11. Supra, note 3.
12. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). "A Court of the United States shall have power to punish
by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, as . . . disobedi-
ence or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command."
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personal knowledge or notice of the order when it was finally issued. Held,
affirmed. Evidence sustained the finding that defendant had actual knowl-
edge through his attorney of the proposed issuance of the order and was
required to surrender to the court at the time specified to the attorney even
though the order was not in fact issued and the statement was made
before the court had jurisdiction. United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726
(2nd Cir. 1952).
The power of the court to punish for contempt has defied any com-
prehensive definition.2 Whether thought of as inherent 3 or statutory4 in
its nature, it certainly is extremely broad and discretionary in its scope.
Contemptuous action has been said to include all acts which are in dis-
respect of a court or its process, and which obstruct the administration of
justice or tend to bring the court into disrepute in the forum of public
opinion." While all contempts are thought of as criminal in their nature, 6
they are classified into civil and criminal contempts, depending on whether
they are remedial7 and for the benefit of private parties,8 or arise from
conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court?
Although the courts generally attempt to follow the procedural
courses of criminal jurisprudence when trying contempt cases, 10 there is
no necessary pattern that they must adhere to." In the trying of cases
held to be civil, the courts often resort to civil procedural rules.12
Contempts arc further distinguishable as those which are direct (coin-
initted in the presence of the court) '3 and may be given summary judgment
2. See In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924); Note, Civil and Criminal Con-
tempt in Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83 (1947); Note, Criminal Contempt of Court
Procedure: A Protection of the Rights of the Individual, 30 CAn4. B. REv. 225 (1952).
3. Ex pare Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (U.S. 1873); United States v. Landis, 97 F.2d
378 (2nd Cir. 1938).
4. In re Cottman, 118 F.2d 425 (2nd Cir. 1941); Rutherford v. Holmes, 66 N.Y.
368, 35 N.Y. Supp. 115 (1877).
5. Ex carte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (U.S. 1873). See 1 BURDicK, TiN LAws oFCRIME, § 268 (1946).
6. BEssette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904); In re Reese 107 Fed. 942
(8th Cir. 1901). Compare Ex parte Moulton, 100 Cal. App.2d 559, 224 P.2d 76
M50); 'Laurie V. Ryan, 130 N.J. Eq. 248, 22 A.2d 6 (1941) (contempt is quasi-criminal).
7. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939); Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297,
95 So. 755 (1923). Cf. State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 Pac. 793 (1928).
8. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). Cf. Boylan v. Detrio, 187 F.2d 375
(5th Cir. 1951).
9. Dale v. State, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N.E. 781 (1926). Cf. State v. Magee Pub. Co.,
29 N.M. 455, 224 Pac. 1028 (1924); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924).
10. Butterfield v. State, 144 Neb. 388, 13 N.W.2d 572 (1942). Cf. Ex parte Gene-
cov, 143 Tex. 476, 186 S.W.2d 225 (19 45).
11, State v. Baker, 222 Iowa 90 , 270 359 (1936). Compare Bessette v.
W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904); State ex rel Short v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256
Pac. 704 (1927) (that contempt proceedings are sui generis); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S.
217 (1931) (prayer of petition for relief determines nature of contempt proceedings as
criminal or civil).
12. National Popsicle Corp. v. Kroll, 104 F.2d 259 (2nd Cir. 1939). Cf. In re
Willis, 242 Ala. 284, 5 So.2d 716 (1942).
13. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 338 Ill. App. 69, 86 N.E.2d 868
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and execution, 4 or those which are indirect (committed at a distance under
circumstances that reasonably tend to degrade the court or interfere in
any way with the administration of justice) " and require notice in the form
of an order to show cause why the contemner should not be cited. 16
While the general area of contempt is still clouded because of the
courts' refusal to limit or define their one means of enforcement, there
has been a trend toward allowing the contemner, by statute and case law,
more procedural and substantive advantages under due process. Today
the right against self-incrimination,'" the right of notice 18 and the pre-
sumption of innocence 19 are all guaranteed in contempt proceedings. The
right to trial by jury, however, must be expressly provided for by statute.20
In criminal contempt proceedings arising from a violation of a court
order, it cannot be doubted that the order must have been definite in its
terms, fixed certain duties on the parties involved 21 and the contemner
must have had actual knowledge of the order before he can be said to be
acting in violation of it.22 Once the contemner has received notice that
the order has been issued he cannot act in violation of it even though
it may have been improvidently rendered2 3 or erroneous. 21  The Supreme
Court in United States v. United Mineworkers" stated that a decree of
the court must be obeyed "short of an indisputable want of authority" of
the court making it. It has been held, under the general power of the
court to punish for contempt, that one who anticipates a suit against
himself may absent himself from the jurisdiction to avoid service of
process without being guilty of contempt, but if the intent to evade
(1949). But cf. People v. Hagopian, 343 111. App. 640, 99 N.E.2d 726 (1951) (extended
to include acts beyond the personal presence of the judge).
14. In re Lands. Lots, or parts of Lots omitted from Foreclosure Proceedings, 146
Ohio St. 589, 67 N.E.2d 433 (1944).
15. People v. Ryan, 412 Ill. 54, 104 N.E.2d 821 (1952). Cf. Stewart v. Atate, 140
Ind. 7, 39 N.E. 508 (1895),
16. Provenzale v. Provenzale, 339 111. App. 345, 90 N.E.2d 115 (1950). See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 42(b).
17. Samuel Compers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
18. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946). Cf. FTC v. A. McLean
and Sons, 94 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1938) (contemner is entitled to know whether proceed-
ings are criminal or civil in their nature).
19. Samuel Compers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). But, in
civil contempt proceedings there is no presumption of innocence of defendant. Coca
Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Texas 1934).
20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
21. Berry v. Midtown Service Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2nd Cir.), cert. dismissed,
308 U.S. 629 (1939).
22. Kelton v. United States, 294 Fed. 491 (3d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 264
U.S. 590 (1924).
23. Douds v. Local 1250, 173 F.2d 764 (2nd Cir. 1949). Cf. SEC v. Okin,
137 F.2d 862 (2nd Cir. 1943); Farewell v. Horton, 301 Ill. App. 372, 22 N.E.2d
958 (1939).
24. United States v. United Mineworkers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Cf. Robertson
v. Comm., 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E. 2d 352 (1943).
25. 330 U.S. 258, 310 (1947).
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service is made after the suit is brought, not only to avoid process, but
to frustrate any orders which may be issued, contempt will lie.26
In the instant case, the court reasoned that respondent's flight, and
the fact that his attorney had notified him of the court's proposed
future issuance of the order, together with the fact that contemner knew
that he was awaiting sentencing, justified the conclusion that he had
actual knowledge of the issuance of the order. Rather than relying upon
the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt, it cited respondent
for violating a particular order which the court had issued. In reality the
court has established a new interpretation of constructive contempt by
holding that one may be guilty of contempt for violating a court order
before the order has been issued. The holding presents a unique27 con-
ception of when contempt will lie under the statutory provision.28 The
court seems to be taking a strong backward step from the trend of expand-
ing the rights of a contemner as expressed in recent statutes and court
decisions.
COURTS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-EXTRINSIC AIDS
.Defendant failed to pay an income tax on money he had eitorted.
Held, by construction of § 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, money
obtained by extortion is taxable income. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S.
130 (1952).
Statutes must be frequently applied to situations not contemplated
at the time of their enactment. Any interpretation by the Supreme Court
becomes an integral part of the satute and is positive law.t Because the
separation of powers doctrine demands that the legislature make all major
policy legislation,2 the Court's duty is merely to determine probable legis-
lative intent.3  To prevent unnecessary judicial "legislation," especially
when construing legislation involving either federal or state supremacy or
a question of balance of powers within the government itself,4 the Court,
in its first construction of a statute, employs extrinsic aids such as previous
legislative history,5 standing committee reports,6 sponsor's explanations 7
26. In re Rice, 181 Fed. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1910). Cf. Aarons v. State, 105 Miss. 402,
62 So. 419 (1913).
27. See United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 729 (2nd Cir. 1952), Clark, J., dis-
scnting: ' . . exhaustive independent research has disclosed no similar case. It is
probably the first time that a proceeding like this has been before the courts."
28. See note 1 supra.
1. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U.S. 509 (1933); White County v. Gwin,
136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237 (1894).
2. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1940).
3. Bardes v. Ilawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524 (1900).
4. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939).
5. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945); Boone v. Light.
ncr, 319 U.S. 561 (1943); Federal Communications v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
311 U.S. 132 (1940).
